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In this paper, we examine a problem of credibility that a central
bank might face when exiting unconventional monetary policy. We
develop a simple dynamic optimization model of a central bank, in
which the bank's pro¯t a®ects its balance sheet. The model derives
the transversality condition that is necessary for the central bank to
be sustainable and to conduct an optimal monetary policy after exiting
monetary easing. In this sense, the transversality condition needs to be
satis¯ed to maintain central bank credibility. We discuss some factors
a®ecting the transversality condition and show that the central bank's
balance sheet should be sound enough to generate no sustained loss.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we examine a problem of credibility that a central bank
might face when exiting unconventional monetary policy. We develop
a simple dynamic optimization model of a central bank, in which the
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bank's pro¯t a®ects its balance sheet, and we show that the bank's
unsound balance sheet might create di±culty in conducting appropriate
monetary policy and thus jeopardize its credibility.
Since the \Lehman shock" in 2008, many central banks in the
industrialized countries have been using the unconventional measures of
monetary easing policy. One of the main measures is quantitative easing,
where a central bank expands the quantity of fund supply beyond the
zero interest rate point. Another one is credit easing, where a central
bank purchases some risky assets.
Many have studied whether such unconventional monetary easing
measures are e®ective or not, and it still remains controversial. Whether
they are e®ective or not, it is better to use such measures so long as
they have no possibility of creating any problem. However, some argue
that they jeopardize central bank credibility, especially when exiting the
monetary easing. A central bank needs credibility that it is sustainable
and maintains its ability to perform its functions such as stabilizing
prices.1) If the unconventional measures damage a central bank's balance
sheet, then the central bank loses such credibility. Therefore, we need
to examine the e®ectiveness of unconventional measures on one hand,
and to assess the cost or risk of damaging the credibility on the other.
Though it is an important issue, surprisingly few studies, as compared
with those on policy e®ectiveness, have analyzed central bank credibility
in this context. Among few are Stella [1997, 2003], Bindseil et al.
[2004], Ize [2005], KlÄuh and Stella [2008], Cincibuch et al. [2009],
Adler et al. [2012] and Tanaka [2013], and they contend that an
unsound balance sheet and low/negative pro¯t of central bank create
1) Note that the credibility here is not the one that a central bank keeps a
promise to ¯ght against in°ation when it has the ability to do so, as Barro
and Gordon [1983] has examined.
|216|
Tanaka?Central Bank Exit Strategies and Credibility
di±culty in conducting appropriate future monetary policy, which leads
to jeopardizing central bank credibility.
These precedent studies have discussed the in°uence of unsound balance
sheet on future monetary policy without showing any model. Bindseil
et al. [2004], Ize [2005], and Cincibuch et al. [2009] are exceptions, but
their models are not derived from any optimizing behavior of a central
bank.2)
In this paper, we develop a formal central bank model from its dynamic
optimizing behavior. Our model incorporates the central bank's balance
sheet and pro¯t on in¯nite time horizon and shows their in°uence on
monetary policy. From this model, we derive the condition that a central
bank must satisfy in order to conduct appropriate monetary policy. If
the bank's balance sheet is unsound, the condition is not satis¯ed, and
the bank has di±culty in conducting appropriate monetary policy and
thus loses central bank credibility.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss what
is considered to jeopardize central bank credibility, and we argue that
its sound balance sheet is important. Then, we develop a dynamic
optimization model of a central bank in Section 3, and analyze the
balance sheet, monetary policy, and credibility in Section 4. Section 5
summarizes the analysis in this paper.
2) Berriel and Bhattarai [2009] is probably the only study to set up a model of
central bank optimizing behavior with its balance sheet and pro¯t constraints.
They do not, however, derive any explicit optimal solution but run a simulation
instead. With the simulation, they examine not central bank credibility but
the monetary policy where a central bank targets its own capital together
with in°ation and output gap.
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2. Central Bank Credibility
2.1. Capital, Pro¯t, and Credibility
Bank credibility depends on the possibility that a bank is sustainable
and will not fail. Capital is considered to be important for any bank, but
private banks do not fail immediately when capital becomes negative.
With negative capital, sooner or later they face the di±culty in raising
necessary liquidity, and liquidity shortage leads them to bankruptcy.
Like private banks, central banks do not fail with negative capital.
Unlike private banks, central banks do not fall short of liquidity, because
they can create liquidity for themselves.
However, this does not necessarily mean that central banks do not
need any capital to maintain credibility. A central bank with less capital
tends to generate less pro¯t. If it continues to make losses, it continues
to create liquidity to ¯nance them. Since supplying more liquidity means
monetary easing policy, it puts an obstacle to conducting monetary
tightening policy when necessary. This possibly leads in°ation to be out
of control and, in this sense, it might jeopardize central bank credibility.
Thus, the important factor for credibility is whether or not a central
bank does not make sustained losses. It depends not only on capital but
also on other ¯nancial elements that a®ect present and future pro¯ts.
Central banks need their balance sheets sound enough to generate
no sustained loss even when they su®er shocks from large ¯nancial
°uctuations, domestic or overseas.
Ueda [2004] and Ize [2005] have examined several cases of troubled
central banks. For example, the central banks in Venezuela, Jamaica,
and Costa Rica had negative capital due to foreign exchange losses or
the cost to deal with domestic ¯nancial crisis. This caused the rise
in the interest rate on borrowings by central banks and expanded the
losses. The banks had di±culty in stopping monetary easing policy due
to the expansion in interest payment, which accelerated in°ation.
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2.2. The Case of the Bank of Japan
For more than a decade, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) has been
taking aggressive monetary easing policy, including some unconventional
measures. While e®ectiveness of such unconventional measures is a
controversial issue, some are concerned about the risk that such measures
might damage the BOJ's credibility in the future. In this subsection,
we discuss the recent situation of the BOJ and see what might be a
problem.
The BOJ has taken unconventional measures in three periods: the
periods of zero interest rate policy (February 1999 to August 2000),
quantitative easing (March 2001 to March 2006), and the policy after
Lehman shock (from September 2008 to the present). The BOJ is now
strengthening such measures by starting \new phase of monetary easing"
in April 2013. In all of these periods, the policy rate was set nearly
at zero, and the BOJ kept supplying more funds to the private sector.
Figure 1 shows that the monetary base was expanded drastically in
the above three periods. Not only in the quantitative easing period,
but also in the other two periods, the BOJ was taking the quantitative
easing measure. The main measure of the monetary base expansion
was outright purchases of Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) as the
¯gure shows. The BOJ also took credit easing by purchasing some risky
assets, especially in the past few years, and total holdings of such risky
assets amount to 9.6 trillion yen as shown in Table 1.
There are two main concerns about the BOJ's credibility. One is
the risk with risky assets and foreign assets. Fortunately, the holdings
of these assets are not large up to now, but they are increasing. The
other is the risk with the huge holdings of JGBs. Their price °uctuates,
and the BOJ bears a large capital loss if the price falls. A fall in
price can be caused by Japanese government's loss in credibility or a
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Figure 1. Monetary Base in Japan
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Table 1. Balance Sheet of the Bank of Japan
??????????????? ????? ????????????? ?????
?????? ?????? ????????????????? ????
?????????????? ???? ??????? ???
?????????????? ???
Notes: Trillion yen in January 2014.
Monetary base does not include coins. Capital includes appropriate reserve
funds. Risky assets are CPs, corporate bonds, stocks, ETFs, and REITs.
Foreign assets include gold.
Source: BOJ.
rise in the interest rate when the economy is exiting a slump. The
BOJ experienced the latter, so we examine its experience in the next
subsection.
2.3. Exit Strategies
It is an important issue how to absorb a large amount of liquidity at
the exit of quantitative easing, which is called exit strategy. The BOJ
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accomplished such absorption when it ended the quantitative easing in
March 2006.
The BOJ's exit strategy can be examined by Table 2. The table
shows the changes in the balance sheet components corresponding to
the decrease in monetary base during the period of half a year and the
period of two years and a half after ending the quantitative easing. The
BOJ decreased the monetary base by more than 20 trillion yen within
half a year. Though it used mainly JGB purchases to expand the
monetary base as seen in Figure 1, it used two measures to shrink it.
In the ¯rst half a year, it used the measure of the short-term operations
such as funds-supplying operations against pooled collateral, RAs, and
bills. It should be noted that the BOJ decreased the funds-supplying
operations, not increasing the funds-absorbing operations. Two years
and a half after, it used the other measure, which is a decrease in the
JGB holdings. It should be noted that it never sold any JGBs but
waited them to be redeemed.
Table 2. The Bank of Japan's Exit Strategy
???????? ?????? ???????? ??????
????????????? ?????? ??????
???? ????? ??????
????????? ???? ?????
?????????? ?????? ??????
??? ????? ?????
??????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????
?????? ??????
??????????????? ?????? ??????
?????? ???????? ???? ????
???????????????????? ????? ?????
Notes: Flow amounts. Trillion yen.
Source: BOJ.
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At the exit of quantitative easing, the interest rates were rising
and asset prices including that of JGBs were falling. To avoid any
capital loss, the BOJ did not sell any JGBs. It waited till they were
redeemed, and for the meantime it absorbed the liquidity by shrinking
the funds-supplying operations.
The BOJ succeeded in exit strategy without bearing any capital loss,
but such an exit strategy is not always feasible. Since most JGBs
are long-term bonds, the BOJ seemed to have prepared for the exit
by purchasing those with shorter maturity period in order to have
many of them redeemed within a couple of years. It decreased the
funds-supplying operations, but to decrease them it needed to have them
expanded before the exit. Hence, it seemed that the BOJ prepared for
the exit carefully.
However, we cannot expect that a central bank can always prepare
for the exit beforehand. The exit may not be predictable, or a sudden
external shock, such as an oil shock, may hit the economy so that the
central bank needs to absorb liquidity immediately. In these cases, such
an exit strategy as the one by the BOJ in 2006 is not possible.
Bernanke [2009] proposes two measures in these cases. One is using
reverse repos, and the other is to pay high interest on private banks'
balances at a central bank to have the balances increased. Both measures
are funds-absorbing measures. They decrease the monetary base by
expanding the central bank liabilities, not by shrinking the central bank
assets as the BOJ did. Since the interest rates should rise after the exit,
large expansion in interest bearing liabilities might impose losses on the
central bank, which might damage its balance sheet and credibility.
Thus, it should be emphasized that the funds-absorbing strategy is
di®erent from the funds-supplying strategy. Though both change the
monetary base, the former strategy changes the size of other liabilities
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on a central bank's balance sheet, while the latter strategy changes
the size of assets. The BOJ was successful by using the latter, and
Bernanke proposes the former when the latter strategy is not available.
Our model in the next section takes into account the di®erence between
funds-supplying and funds-absorbing strategies. With the model, we
examine the relation of the balance sheet and pro¯t with monetary
policy and credibility, and we show that the relation di®ers depending
on the funds-supplying or funds-absorbing strategies.
3. A Simple Dynamic Optimization Model of a Central Bank
3.1. Model Setting
In this section, we develop a simple dynamic optimization model of
a central bank. We incorporate the central bank's balance sheet and
pro¯t on in¯nite time horizon into the central bank behavior. With the
model, we examine the bank's behavior at an exit of monetary easing.
At an exit, a central bank needs to stop the expansion of monetary
base, and so it is assumed to minimize the following quadratic loss
function:
min
¢Ht
L =
1X
t=1
¯t

1
2
¢H2t

: (1)
¢Ht is a change in monetary base at t, and ¯ is a discount factor. The
bank has been taking a quantitative easing by keeping positive ¢Ht
up to t = 0, and it starts an exit strategy to reduce ¢Ht at t = 1,
.., 1.3) With uncertainty, we need an expectation operator, but we
assume certainty for simplicity, since introducing uncertainty does not
change any important implications discussed in this paper.
3) The exit strategy in our model is only to reduce the expansion of monetary
base, while the BOJ took more aggressive one in 2006; it shrank the quantity
of monetary base. Such an aggressive strategy can be examined by modifying
the objective loss function, and it remains for the future study.
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If it can set ¢Ht freely, as usually presupposed in many precedent
studies, the central bank sets ¢Ht = 0 for t = 1,.., 1. It may not be
the case, however, if we take into account the central bank's balance
sheet and pro¯t, which impose constraint on its behavior.
The central bank's balance sheet in our model is Table 3, where At
is the assets with interest rate rAt, Ht is the monetary base, Bt is the
other liabilities that are all assumed to bear interest at the rate rBt,
and Kt is the capital. Its pro¯t ¼t is,
¼t = rAtAt ¡ rBtBt ¡O; (2)
where O is the central bank operation expenditures, and the pro¯t is
added to the capital in the next period:
Kt = Kt¡1 + ¼t¡1: (3)
Kt and ¢Ht can be negative, while At and Bt should be non-negative.
At the beginning of t = 1, the central bank sets ¢Ht for t = 1,
..., 1 given the initial conditions and exogenous variables. The initial
conditions are A0, B0, H0, K0, and ¼0 that is determined by the other
initial variables. The exogenous variables are rAt, rBt, and O. To
exit monetary easing and reduce ¢Ht, the central bank can take the
strategy to change either Bt or At, and we discuss each strategy in the
subsequent subsections.
Table 3. Central Bank Balance Sheet
????????At ? ???????????????? Ht?
??????????????????????????????Bt?
?????????Kt?
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3.2. The Model with Changes in Liabilities
In this subsection, we discuss the strategy where the central bank
changes the interest bearing liabilities Bt to reduce the monetary base
growth. As discussed in the Subsection 2.3, the measures to change the
assets are not always available, especially when exit strategy requires
quick monetary tightening policy. If not available, the central bank
needs to expand the liabilities such as reverse repos for tightening policy.
We assume At = ¹A. With this and equation (3), the following balance
sheet constraint applies:
Ht +Bt = Ht¡1 +Bt¡1 ¡ ¼t¡1:
Using equation (2), this constraint becomes,
Bt +¢Ht = (1 + rBt¡1)Bt¡1 ¡ rAt¡1 ¹A+O; ¢Ht = Ht ¡Ht¡1: (4)
We also need another constraint, Bt ¸ 0, but we neglect it to simplify
the model handling and restrict our discussion to the case of non-negative
Bt.
4) Thus, the central bank minimizes the loss function (1) subject to
(4) with respect to ¢Ht and Bt. ¢Ht is a control variable, and Bt is
a state variable.
We set the Lagrangian V , where ¸t is the Lagrangian multiplier.
V =
1X
t=1
¯t

1
2
¢H2t +¸t

(1 + rBt¡1)Bt¡1¡rAt¡1 ¹A+O¡Bt¡¢Ht
	
: (5)
The ¯rst order conditions are as follows.5)
4) We can modify our model to have the non-negative constraint on Bt by
using Kuhn-Tucker theorem. In that case, when the non-negative constraint
is binding, ¢Ht cannot be controlled by the central bank but determined by
equation (4).
5) To check the second order condition, it is easier to calculate by substituting
(4) into (1) to eliminate ¢Ht:
?? min
Bt
L =
1P
t=1
¯t

1
2

(1 + rBt¡1)Bt¡1 ¡ rAt¡1 ¹A+O ¡ Bt
	2
:
The second order condition is always satis¯ed as follows:
?? d2L=dB2
t
= ¯t + ¯t+1 (1 + rBt)
2 > 0:
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@V=@¢Ht = ¯
t (¢Ht ¡ ¸t) = 0; (6a)
@V=@Bt = ¡¯t¸t + ¯t+1¸t+1 (1 + rBt) = 0; (6b)
@V @¸t = ¯
t (1 + rBt¡1)Bt¡1¡ rAt¡1 ¹A+O ¡Bt ¡¢Ht= 0: (6c)
From equations (6a) and (6b),
¯ (1 + rBt)¢Ht+1 = ¢Ht: (7)
? The following transversality condition must be satis¯ed:
lim
T!1
¯T¸TBT = 0: (8)
Equation (8) can be rewritten,
lim
T!1
¯T¸TBT = lim
T!1
¯T¸T
T
¦
t=1
(1 + rBt¡1)
BT
T
¦
t=1
(1 + rBt¡1)
:
From equation (6b), ¯T¸T
T
¦
t=1
(1 + rBt¡1) is constant at any T , so the
transversality condition reduces to,
lim
T!1
BT
T
¦
t=1
(1 + rBt¡1)
= 0: (80)
This condition implies that BT should not grow faster than its interest
payment.
3.3. The Model with Changes in Assets
The other strategy is that the central bank changes the asset holdings
At to control the monetary base. We assume Bt = ¹B, and the balance
sheet constraint is,
At = At¡1 + ¼t¡1 +¢Ht:
Using equation (2), this constraint becomes,
At ¡¢Ht = (1 + rAt¡1)At¡1 ¡ rBt¡1 ¹B ¡O: (9)
As in Subsection 3.2, we neglect the non-negative constraint and discuss
only the case of At ¸ 0. The central bank minimizes the loss function
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(1) subject to (9) with respect to ¢Ht and At.
We set the Lagrangian V :
V =
1X
t=1
¯t

1
2
¢H2t + ¸t

(1 + rAt¡1)At¡1 ¡ rBt¡1 ¹B ¡O ¡At +¢Ht
	
:
(10)
The ¯rst order conditions are as follows:6)
@V=@¢Ht = ¯
t (¢Ht + ¸t) = 0; (11a)
@V=@At = ¡¯t¸t + ¯t+1¸t+1 (1 + rAt) = 0; (11b)
@V=@¸t = ¯
t(1+rAt¡1)At¡1¡rBt¡1 ¹B¡O¡At+¢Ht = 0: (11c)
From equations (11a) and (11b),
¯ (1 + rAt)¢Ht+1 = ¢Ht: (12)
The following transversality condition must be satis¯ed:
lim
T!1
¯T¸TAT = 0: (13)
Equation (13) reduces to,
lim
T!1
AT
T
¦
t=1
(1 + rAt¡1)
= 0: (130)
It implies that AT should not grow faster than its interest revenue.
4. Transversality Condition and Credibility
4.1. The Model with Changes in Liabilities
We examine an optimal monetary policy and transversality condition
in our model to derive some implications on central bank credibility.
The optimal monetary policy must satisfy equation (7). It states only
an intertemporal relation of ¢H, not each level of ¢H. Let us suppose
¢Ht = 0 for t = 1, ¢ ¢ ¢ , 1. This time path of ¢H satis¯es equation
6) The second order condition is always satis¯ed as follows:
? d2L=dA2
t
= ¯t + ¯t+1 (1 + rAt)
2 > 0:
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(7) and produces the least value of the loss function (1). Then, the
question is whether or not this monetary policy satis¯es the transversality
condition (80).
With the balance sheet constraint (4), reducing ¢Ht increases Bt, which
reduces the pro¯t and puts an expansionary pressure on future ¢Ht+1
and Bt+1. The transversality condition (8
0) requires BT expansion to be
less than its interest payment. When B is positive, the transversality
condition (80) implies,
BT
T
¦
t=1
(1 + rBt¡1)
¡ BT¡1
T¡1
¦
t=1
(1 + rBt¡1)
????????? =
1
T
¦
t=1
(1 + rBt¡1)
[BT ¡ (1 + rBT¡1)BT¡1]
????????? =
1
T
¦
t=1
(1 + rBt¡1)
¡¢HT ¡ rAT¡1 ¹A+O < 0:
Then,
¢HT > ¡
 
rAT¡1 ¹A¡O

: (800)
The monetary policy, ¢Ht =0 for t =1, ..., 1, satis¯es the transversality
condition if rAT¡1 ¹A ¡ O > 0. In this case, the central bank can
stop the monetary base expansion immediately. On the contrary, if
rAT¡1 ¹A ¡ O · 0, then ¢HT cannot be equal to zero in order to
satisfy the transversality condition. ¢Ht must follow the intertemporal
relation given by equation (7), and so ¢Ht at any t is positive since
¯ (1 + rBt) > 0.
7)
The transversality condition (80) states that the central bank cannot
increase BT unlimitedly in order to control the monetary base. If it
7) Even when rAT¡1 ¹A ¡ O · 0, the transversality condition holds at ¢HT = 0,
since ¸T = 0 from equation (6a). Such a case seems to be unrealistic since it
means that accumulating liabilities do not matter, and it might be because
our model, especially the loss function, is too much simpli¯ed.
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increases BT beyond the transversality condition, it makes less pro¯ts
or more losses and faces the pressure to supply more monetary base
to ¯nance the losses. To avoid the monetary base expansion, it must
absorb the added monetary base by increasing BT , which causes more
losses. The liabilities become out of control, and the central bank is
no longer sustainable. If it reduces or stops piling up liabilities, then
it is forced to accelerate the monetary base growth. The monetary
policy is not optimal, and we will have in°ation. Either case damages
the economy due to the central bank problem. Thus, the central bank
loses credibility if the transversality condition is not satis¯ed.
4.2. The Model with Changes in Assets
In the model with changes in assets, the transversality condition is
(130), stating that AT should not grow faster than its interest revenue.
If this condition is not satis¯ed, the policy is not optimal, but it does
not seem to cause any serious problem. The central bank can slow
down the asset accumulation anytime by giving some part of pro¯t to
the government.
With similar calculation in Subsection 4.1, when A is positive, equation
(130) is satis¯ed if the following holds:
¢HT < rBT¡1 ¹B +O (1300)
Unlike equation (800), equation (1300) always holds when ¢HT =0. The
asset holdings do not grow faster than its interest so long as the central
bank conducts the optimal monetary policy.
The di®erence in transversality conditions in the above two models
clari¯es the di®erence between using the funds-supplying strategy or
using the funds-absorbing strategy discussed in Subsection 2.3. The BOJ
succeeded in exiting the quantitative easing by using the funds-supplying
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strategy, and such exit strategy corresponds to our model with changes
in assets. Equation (1300) holds, and the transversality condition is
always satis¯ed. On the other hand, if such an exit strategy is not
available, the bank needs to use the funds-absorbing strategy, which
corresponds to our model with changes in liabilities. Equation (800)
does not always hold, and when it does not hold, the bank cannot
conduct appropriate monetary policy and loses credibility as discussed
above. Our discussion warns that central banks should be cautious in
using the funds-absorbing exit strategy.
4.3. Capital, Balance Sheet, and Interest Rates
Our model shows that a central bank might lose credibility when it
needs to take the strategy to expand the interest bearing liabilities. It is
noteworthy that the condition stated as equation (800) does not depend
on the capital. The central bank can be credible even if its capital is
small or negative. Figure 2 exhibits a numerical example of such an
extreme case. Since rAT¡1 ¹A ¡ O > 0, the central bank sets ¢Ht = 0
for t = 1, ..., 1. The capital becomes negative and decreasing, but the
value of transversality condition function (80) is converging to zero. The
capital becomes negative, but the central bank can be credible because
it can conduct the optimal monetary policy.
However, the capital does a®ect the situation of central bank. Less
capital K0 implies less asset holdings ¹A, which makes the condition
(800) more restrictive. A central bank may su®er a large loss due to
foreign exchange loss or the cost to deal with domestic ¯nancial crisis,
as the troubled central banks discussed in Subsection 2.1. Such a loss
decreases the central bank's asset holdings and capital. In our model,
they correspond to small K0 and ¹A. Small ¹A incurs sustained loss and
makes it di±cult to control the monetary base by changing liabilities as
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Figure 2. A Numerical Example
???
???
?
??
??
??
??
???
? ?? ?? ?? ??
Kt Bt ??????????????
? Notes: The following is assumed.
????? H0 = 30, K0 = 20, B0 = 50, O = 5:1, rAt = rBt = 0:1, ¯ = 0:05.
????? \Transversality" is the value of BT=
T
¦
t=1
(1 + rBt¡1).
????? ¢Ht = 0 for t = 1,.., 1 satis¯es equation (800) as ¡
 
rAt ¹A¡O

= ¡4:9.
shown by equation (800). Thus, not the capital alone but the balance
sheet as a whole is important for the bank credibility.
It should also be noted that equation (800) does not include rB . Some
experiences of troubled central banks discussed in Subsection 2.1 indicate
that a rise in the interest rate on central bank liabilities deteriorated
the situation, but our model argues that it does not depend on such
an interest rate change whether or not the central bank is sustainable.
A rise in the liability interest rate, however, a®ects the time path
of ¢H. Equation (7) shows that the relative sizes of ¢H at t and
t+1 depend on ¯ (1 + rBt); higher rBt leads to higher ¢Ht to suppress
the expensive Bt expansion. If the interest rate rBt is smaller than
the discount rate implied by ¯, then ¯ (1 + rBt) < 1. ¢Ht is smaller
than ¢Ht+1, which keeps the immediate monetary base expansion and
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in°ation mild. ¢Ht+1 is larger, however, and so the monetary base
expansion and in°ation gradually accelerate. If rBt is larger than the
discount rate, then ¯ (1 + rBt) > 1, and ¢Ht+1 is smaller. Though ¢H
gradually shrinks, ¢H has a positive lower bound in the future as shown
by the transversality condition (8"), and so ¢H in early periods must be
large. Thus, the higher liability interest rate implies an immediate large
monetary base expansion and high in°ation. Furthermore, if the interest
rate remains high, ¢H will approach to zero, and the transversality
condition will not be satis¯ed sooner or later.
The transversality condition depends on some of the initial and
exogenous variables, and it should be noted that these variables are
largely a®ected by what has happened before t = 1. A loss from
domestic or foreign asset transactions or a cost to deal with domestic
¯nancial crisis has an impact on ¹A and/or O, or purchasing low-return
assets keeps rAt low for a while. Given these variables, our model
checks whether or not the central bank can reduce the monetary base
expansion at t = 1,.., 1. Thus, one of the important implications from
our simple model is that a central bank needs to be ready for a large
economic shock so that it does not lose its balance sheet soundness and
pro¯tability due to the shock.8)
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined how a central bank can keep its
credibility when exiting monetary easing. For this purpose, we have
developed a dynamic optimization model of a central bank and examined
the central bank credibility. Unlike the existing literature, we have
incorporated the central bank's balance sheet and pro¯t into the model
8) Stella [2003] emphasizes the importance to withstand economic shocks and
argues that central banks need \¯nancial strength."
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and considered the central bank behavior that minimizes the loss function
on in¯nite time horizon by controlling the monetary base. We also
have taken into account the di®erence between a funds-supplying exit
strategy and a funds-absorbing exit strategy. With each exit strategy,
the model has analyzed whether or not the central bank can stop the
monetary base expansion, and our analysis has found the followings.
First, the central bank credibility is closely related to the transversality
condition. If the condition is not satis¯ed, the central bank is not
sustainable or it is forced to conduct inappropriate in°ationary policy.
Thus, without the condition satis¯ed, the central bank loses credibility.
Second, the transversality condition di®ers depending on using either the
funds-supplying strategy or funds-absorbing strategy, and the condition
for using the funds-absorbing strategy is not always satis¯ed. Central
banks may face a sudden necessity for monetary tightening, and the
funds-supplying strategy may not be available. Our analysis, however,
warns that central banks should be cautious in using funds-absorbing
measures for tightening as the transversality condition is not always
satis¯ed.
Finally, the transversality condition and credibility is not directly
related with the central bank capital. They depend on the initial
conditions and exogenous variables, which constitute the balance sheet
soundness. The central bank's balance sheet should be sound enough to
generate no sustained loss, even when the central bank su®ers a large
economic shock.
Our model is a simple one, and many extensions are possible, such
as introducing uncertainty, pro¯t transfer to the government, and so
on. They remain for the future study.
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